New York County Defender Services

Testimony of 

Brittany Brown Supervisor, Collateral Consequences Unit 

New York County Defender Services 

Before the City Council Committee on Immigration Oversight - Examining the Executive Order 13 of 2026 Report of Audit Findings and Recommendations. 

September 22, 2026 

Thank you to the Committee on Immigration for holding this public hearing on Executive Order 13’s Report of Audit Findings and Recommendations. 

My name is Brittany Brown and I am the Supervising Attorney of the Collateral Consequences Unit at New York County Defender Services (NYCDS). NYCDS is an indigent defense office that every year represents tens of thousands of New Yorkers in Manhattan’s Criminal, Family, and Supreme Courts. Our organization includes attorneys who specialize in immigration matters, and advise our clients on any immigration consequences stemming from criminal legal system-involvement, including deportation. They also assist our non-citizen clients with other immigration issues, such as submitting affirmative applications and accompanying them to ICE check-ins. Consequently, we frequently represent clients who may have collateral immigration consequences due to their interaction with the criminal legal system. 

We thank you, Chair Encarnacion, for holding today's oversight hearing. 

1. Executive Order 13 and the City’s Sanctuary Protections

In response to mounting concerns regarding federal immigration enforcement in New York City, including a Department of Investigation (“DOI”) investigation that found that a Department of Correction (“DOC”) employee improperly assisted federal immigration authorities in locating

individuals in DOC custody,1 and a separate DOI investigation that found that an NYPD officer improperly assisted federal authorities with civil immigration enforcement,2 Mayor Mamdani issued Executive Order 13, Protecting New Yorkers from Abusive Immigration Enforcement, in February 2026.3 The Executive Order directed DOC, the NYPD, and other City agencies to conduct comprehensive audits of their policies, practices, and protocols governing interactions with federal immigration authorities. The Order sought to ensure that City agencies were complying with New York City’s sanctuary laws and that City personnel, resources, and information were not being used to facilitate civil immigration enforcement. 

NYCDS is grateful to the Mayoral Administration for undertaking this necessary and historically overdue review, and recognizing that meaningful sanctuary protections need to exist in practice. The resulting audit identified concerning weaknesses in and violations of the City’s existing safeguards. Among other findings, the audit documented the extraordinary increase in federal immigration enforcement requests directed at City agencies: DOC received 895 civil immigration detainer requests in 2025, an increase of more than 120% from the prior year.4 The audit also identified gaps in agency procedures for receiving, documenting, reviewing, and responding to requests from federal immigration authorities and recommended stronger supervisory review, documentation, training, reporting, and ongoing compliance audits.5 

1. The Audit Exposed Previously Undisclosed Information Sharing at DOC

The audit itself demonstrates the importance of this sustained oversight. In examining DOC’s practices, the audit identified information-sharing practices that were unknown and had received little public scrutiny. Most notably, the audit found that DOC affirmatively and routinely transmitted information concerning individuals in its custody to federal authorities without first receiving a request for that information.6 Specifically, DOC sent federal law enforcement agencies daily lists containing information about individuals in custody, including lists related to new admissions and releases. This practice raises serious questions about whether information collected because of a person’s involvement in our City’s criminal legal system may ultimately facilitate federal immigration enforcement, even where, shockingly, federal immigration authorities have not affirmatively sought that information from the City. 

The significance of this finding cannot be understated. It is unimaginable that in a sanctuary city, a city agency would preemptively cooperate with federal immigration authorities without any approval for such a policy from the Mayor’s office. We are grateful that this was discovered during the audit and shows how this administration is handling the situation differently than previous ones. But it also illustrates how difficult it can be for the Council, advocates, and the public to understand how information actually moves through DOC without meaningful and sustained oversight. There have been countless hearings where DOC has testified in front of the Council, but not once was this policy ever disclosed. That is why formal policies may describe when information should be shared, but they do not necessarily reveal the routine practices and informal processes through which information is actually transmitted. 

This concern is particularly acute at DOC, where basic limitations on the Department’s infrastructure can themselves frustrate accountability. As we learned during the Council’s recent DOI oversight hearing, for example, DOC corrections officers do not have individual Department email addresses—a seemingly basic administrative deficiency that can create significant obstacles to preserving communications, reconstructing events, and determining who knew or communicated what and when. We were stunned to learn this fact during that hearing. And, it was only revealed due to an off-handed comment that had little to do with the question posed. It just further demonstrates that DOC operates in an opaque manner, and that robust oversight is necessary to scratch the surface of what is going on. 

2. ICE’s Characterization of Administrative Requests Raises Concerns

NYCDS has also seen troubling examples of federal immigration authorities attempting to blur the distinction between administrative requests and judicial warrants. ICE has sent DOC documents described simply as “warrants,” that are, in fact, administrative immigration requests issued by immigration officers—not warrants reviewed and signed by judges. In the instances our office has encountered, DOC has acted appropriately and forwarded these requests to defense counsel rather than treating them as judicial warrants. We appreciate DOC’s adherence to the law in these specific cases. But the requests themselves are concerning, and demonstrate an escalation of tactics being used by ICE. 

3. DOC Personnel Have Facilitated ICE Contact with People in Custody

We have also seen concerning and arguably unlawful examples of DOC personnel facilitating direct contact between people in custody and federal immigration authorities. In one recent case, while our client was in DOC custody, a correction officer approached him with a form asking whether he wished to participate in an interview with ICE. Put more simply, DOC personnel were facilitating ICE’s access to a person in City custody. We believe this type of facilitation violated our City’s detainer law, which sharply limits DOC’s use of City personnel and resources to assist federal civil immigration enforcement. This example would not have been caught by the audit, and shows why the audit’s analysis needs to go beyond formal requests. 

1. Immigration Information in Department of Probation Presentence Investigations

The audit’s discussion of the Department of Probation’s collection and inclusion of immigration information in presentence investigation reports also raises important questions.7 State regulations direct probation officers to gather certain information concerning citizenship and immigration status and make reasonable efforts to verify it. But those regulations do not require every piece of information gathered to be included in the final report. 9 NYCRR § 350.7 expressly recognizes that a presentence report need not include all information obtained during the investigation. 

More fundamentally, an obligation to gather or verify immigration information should not become a basis for DOP to routinely contact federal immigration authorities. The City should determine what immigration information is actually required to be in the PSI, where DOP can obtain or verify necessary information without contacting ICE, and what safeguards can ensure that the PSI process does not become a conduit for federal immigration enforcement. This practice carries particularly serious consequences if fear that DOP may contact ICE leads some New Yorkers to choose incarceration rather than risk exposing themselves to immigration enforcement through probation. 

 III. The Audit Does Not Capture the Full Scope of Information Sharing 

Additionally, while we appreciate the Administration undertaking this important audit, we disagree with the report’s conclusion that the City’s existing laws and agency protocols have “largely worked as intended.”8 The audit’s own findings go against such a broad conclusion. The review identified gaps in agency policies and procedures, inadequate mechanisms for documenting and reviewing interactions with federal immigration authorities, and information-sharing practices that raise significant concerns about whether existing safeguards are sufficient. We are also concerned that the audit appears to focus heavily on formal requests for information from federal immigration authorities. While tracking and scrutinizing such requests is essential, a formal request from ICE or another federal agency is only one way that information can reach federal immigration authorities. Modern surveillance and information-sharing systems increasingly allow government agencies to obtain information through shared databases, law enforcement partnerships, third-party vendors, and interconnected surveillance networks. That is why there may be no discrete request from ICE to a City agency like DOC or the NYPD that can be identified and audited. The City must also examine the pathways through which such information can be accessed without such a request: what information City agencies and their contractors collect; where the information is stored and what storage systems are involved; whether information can be obtained through another law-enforcement agency or private vendor; and what technical safeguards and audit mechanisms exist to prevent information from being used for civil immigration enforcement. 

1. The Audit Does Not Adequately Examine Technology and Third-Party Data Sharing

The audit’s conclusion that City safeguards are largely working is particularly difficult to reconcile with its limited examination of the technological systems through which sensitive City data can be accessed and shared. The report itself recognizes that federal immigration enforcement increasingly relies on information obtained through government databases, private contractors, and data brokers.9 Yet, its technological review appears to have focused largely on whether certain City contracts contained the required Identifying Information Law rider and contractual provisions restricting data sharing.10 The report does not identify the technologies or vendors examined, explain what data they collect or where the data flows, identify who can access or query it, or indicate whether the City reviewed actual access or audit logs. The presence of required contractual language cannot alone establish that sensitive City data is protected from federal immigration authorities. 

DOC’s relationship with Securus illustrates the limitations of this approach. Their contract does not adequately restrict how Securus itself may access, use, or repurpose the vast quantities of sensitive information it stores, including whether that information may be used to develop or train artificial-intelligence (AI) systems, which we know Securus is doing.11 Nor is it clear what mechanisms allow the City to determine whether Securus receives and responds to requests for information directly from ICE or other federal agencies. Without meaningful contractual restrictions, reporting requirements, and auditing mechanisms, data sharing could potentially occur at the vendor level without the City ever knowing it happened. 

These risks become more significant as surveillance systems become interconnected. Securus markets THREADS as a centralized data repository capable of combining communication, voice biometrics, financial information, cell phone forensic data, and other investigative information, and expressly advertises its ability to share investigative data with other agencies that opt in.12 THREADS has also been represented as having integration capabilities with Palantir, a company with a longstanding and substantial contractual relationship with ICE. The City should first determine whether any such integration exists or is enabled by Securus, and then ensure there are technical safeguards to prevent any such information sharing. 

Similar questions arise regarding NYPD surveillance technologies, including automated license plate readers. The NYPD collects large quantities of location-related vehicle data through its license plate reader network, raising questions about how that information may be accessed or shared beyond the Department, and whether the audit adequately examined those pathways. 

There are also unanswered questions regarding DOC’s participation in law enforcement intelligence-sharing arrangements. In 2019, DOC publicly stated that there is a Fusion Center on Rikers Island.13 Fusion centers are specifically designed to facilitate information sharing across law-enforcement agencies and to leverage databases, systems, and networks for that purpose. Yet, DOC has not provided clear answers about whether the Rikers Island fusion center remains operational. If it does, which federal and state agencies can participate? What DOC information can federal personnel access, and is that access logged and auditable? And what safeguards prevent information shared for “acceptable” law enforcement purposes from subsequently being accessed or used for civil immigration enforcement? 

The audit’s review of data sharing does not appear to capture the full range of ways in which City information can move between agencies, vendors, third parties, and various technological systems. As these systems become increasingly interconnected, the City may not know who ultimately has access to sensitive information or how that information is subsequently used or repurposed. The audit does not make clear whether it traced these data flows, reviewed actual access and audit logs, examined how vendors and third parties respond to federal requests for information, or determined whether the City would even know when such sharing occurs. Meaningful oversight requires the City to follow its data beyond the agency that collects it. We need to understand where the data goes, who can access it, how it can be shared and repurposed, and what technical and auditing mechanisms, not merely contractual protections, prevent its use for civil immigration enforcement. 

1. The Council must pass legislation ending the DOC/ICE communication loopholes The DOI’s findings underscore the need for the Council to enact legislation that closes the communication loopholes that currently exist between DOC and ICE. Our sanctuary city laws were created to limit cooperation between local agencies and federal immigration enforcement, particularly when no judicial warrant exists. However, DOC has adopted an interpretation of the City’s detainer laws that allows DOC staff to communicate with immigration authorities even when no warrant has been issued. DOC argues that they are allowed to communicate a person’s release date, incarceration status, and court appearance dates without a judicial warrant to ICE. We believe its interpretation of Admin. Code § 9-131 is flagrantly illegal under provision (b). Moreover, DOC denies delaying the release of our clients so that ICE can more easily detain them upon release, but in our experience we have noticed blatant delays in our client’s release that are otherwise unexplainable. 

DOC has also adopted a policy interpreting Admin. Code § 9-131 to treat the instant arrest as a qualifying conviction that allows communication with ICE. We do not believe that interpretation is consistent with the text of the law, which refers to individuals who have been convicted within the previous five years of certain offenses, clearly indicating prior convictions rather than the arrest that brought a person into custody. 

We believe these actions are illegal and clearly inconsistent with both the purpose and the plain intent of our laws. DOC’s actions demonstrate how agencies can exploit ambiguous language to circumvent the City’s legal safeguards. We cannot trust DOC to address their own violations as the communications obtained through a public records request unequivocally showed extreme anti-immigrant sentiments within DOC as email communications to ICE from DOC used the hashtag #teamsendthemback. That is why we are calling on the Council to enact legislation clarifying that DOC personnel may not communicate with immigration authorities regarding individuals in custody except in the narrow circumstances explicitly permitted by law. Clear statutory language will ensure that the City’s sanctuary protections are implemented as intended and will prevent agencies from relying on interpretations that undermine those protections. 

That is why we urge the Council to enact legislation that would close the communication loopholes that currently exist between DOC and ICE.

1. The Council must pass the New York City Trust Act (Int. 0209-2026)

We urge the Council to support and pass the New York City Trust Act (Int. 0209-2026), which would strengthen accountability when city agencies violate our sanctuary laws. Under this legislation, when an individual’s rights are violated due to local cooperation with federal immigration authorities, they could sue the City for damages. Meaning when agencies unlawfully honor federal detainers or share information with immigration authorities, individuals will have legal recourse. This private right of action is critical because as we have already seen, city agencies such as the NYPD and DOC have violated these laws, resulting in grave harm to immigrant communities. Allowing individuals to have a private right of action against such illegal behavior could also incentivize the agency to start acting in better faith, for they may be more likely to provide more information as to what is happening due to the fear of a possible future lawsuit. Otherwise, there is no reason for DOC, or any other city agency, to adhere to a law if there are no true repercussions for noncompliance.  

For this reason, we urge the passage of the New York City Trust Act (Int. 0209-2026), which would create a private right of action so that people wronged by violations of our already existing laws can seek justice in courts. This bill would make sure that city agencies can be held accountable when violations occur, helping ensure compliance with existing laws, and allowing immigrants to feel safer during their legal proceedings. 

VII. Conclusion 

We thank the Council for holding an important oversight hearing, and we thank the Mayoral Administration for undertaking this critical audit of City agencies. The audit is an important first step towards ensuring compliance with the City’s sanctuary laws, but more work remains. 

For this reason we are calling on the Council to pass stronger safeguards. The Council must act to ensure that city agencies comply with the law by passing legislation that closes the communication loopholes between DOC and ICE and by passing the New York City Trust Act (Int. 0209-2026), which would provide a private right of action for individuals harmed by violations of our law. 

But legislation alone is not enough. The Mayor and Council must continue to scrutinize City agencies through regular and comprehensive audits, and meaningful oversight to ensure compliance with our sanctuary laws, and protect New Yorkers from unlawful information sharing and cooperation with federal immigration authorities. 

If you have any questions about my testimony, please email policy@nycds.org.